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Considering the “Illogical Patchwork”: The Broadcasting Board 
of Governors and U.S. International Broadcasting
Abstract
At its December 2012 board meeting, members of the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) announced that they 
needed more time to consider a plan that would create a single 
executive responsible for day-to-day operations of the organization 
responsible for overseeing U.S. government-supported international 
broadcasting efforts. Operating with a budget of more than $700 
million and producing content in more than 50 languages, the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors qualifies as one of the world’s 
largest international news organizations. Using discussions about 
the need for reorganization of the BBG’s management structure as 
impetus, this article discusses the role of the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors in American public diplomacy efforts and considers 
its accompanying responsibilities as a large, media management 
organization. Noting a dearth of academic and policy-oriented 
research focused on the BBG, this article seeks to provide a 
foundation for future discussion of issues surrounding its leadership, 
its performance and its future.
Introduction
At its December 2012 board meeting, members of the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) announced that they 
needed more time to consider a plan that would create a single 
executive responsible for day-to-day operations of the organization 
responsible for overseeing U.S. government-supported international 
broadcasting efforts.1 Operating with a budget of more than $700 
million and producing content in more than 50 languages, the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors qualifies as one of the world’s 
largest international news organizations.2 Despite the size and 
scope of its operations, however, the BBG is an infrequent topic of 
discussion in academic or policy contexts. With respect to media 
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coverage, evidence from recent months reveals an organization most 
likely to be mentioned in the context of organizational challenges. 
These challenges are many including: ill-fated decisions to change 
mechanisms for content distribution; failed efforts to eliminate 
broadcasts in certain languages; controversies surrounding dismissal 
of journalists at various broadcasters; debates about both the cost of 
contracting for and the accuracy of audience measurements; worries 
about turnover on the BBG’s governing board; and persistently poor 
performance in surveys evaluating workplace quality in the federal 
government.
The BBG is a large, government-funded organization charged 
with overseeing the global operations of five different broadcasters. 
Each broadcaster has its own mission, although in practice, the 
missions and audiences of broadcasters occasionally overlap 
with others in the U.S. international broadcasting (USIB) stable. 
Additionally, each of the five broadcasters has its own budget, its 
own history, its own culture, and its own relationship with members 
of Congress and foreign audiences. The New York Times once mused 
that “The United States government may be the largest broadcaster 
that few Americans know about.”3 This is attributable, at least in 
part, to the fact that the content produced by the five broadcasters 
has not been easily available to American audiences in the United 
States.4 This results in the lack of any domestic constituency for 
most of the broadcasters. It also means there is little independent 
analysis of the quality of the content produced by the broadcasters, 
few efforts to verify the accuracy of the organization’s self-reported 
performance indicators, and no clear method for assessing return on 
taxpayers’ investment in the organization as whole.
A pattern of inattention to the BBG on the part of academics, 
policymakers, and domestic journalists is perhaps not surprising. The 
BBG is a complicated entity that is difficult to discuss in isolation. 
This article presents information necessary for understanding the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors, while also making an argument 
for the importance of increased academic, policy, and media 
attention to the independent federal agency. The Broadcasting 
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Board of Governors is both a large foreign-policy institution and 
a significant media management organization. It is therefore an 
important topic for discussion in the American public diplomacy 
context. Identifying the five broadcasters for which the BBG has 
responsibility, considering the statutory justifications for the BBG 
and its place in American foreign policy, and presenting current 
discussions about management structure for the organization, this 
article suggests the BBG is worthy of more serious academic, policy, 
and media attention than it has hitherto received.
Discussion begins with consideration of international 
broadcasting as a component of public diplomacy. Attention then 
turns to an introduction of each of the five broadcasters under the 
BBG’s purview. Statutory justification for the BBG specifically, 
and for U.S. international broadcasting more generally, is the next 
topic for consideration, including mention of the legislation that has 
prevented the formal dissemination of USIB content in the United 
States. With all the preceding as context, discussion then moves to 
the management structure of the BBG, long-standing concerns about 
the ineffectiveness of the current arrangement, and consideration of 
the possibility of the appointment of a single leader to the drive the 
organization into the future.
Public diplomacy, the BBG, and international broadcasting
Public diplomacy is generally understood as a country’s efforts 
to engage foreign publics. It is one of many tools in a nation’s foreign 
policy toolbox and is used accordingly by the United States “to 
promote U.S. interests abroad.”5 American public diplomacy efforts 
can be divided into five categories including mediated diplomacy, 
public information, political action, educational and cultural 
exchange programs, and international news channels.6 The work 
of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and its efforts to “inform, 
engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom 
and democracy”7 clearly fall into the category of international news 
channels.
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Writing about international broadcasting, communication 
scholar Monroe Price calls it “the use of electronic media by one 
society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another.”8 
While some chafe at the categorization of international broadcasters 
and their employees as participants in a country’s public diplomacy 
efforts,9 when considered as part of the broader foreign policy picture, 
international broadcasters are indisputably part of a country’s efforts 
to reach foreign audiences. An article in The Economist put state-
sponsored international broadcasting in context, suggesting that 
having an international news channel is increasingly a status symbol 
for leading players in the global arena.10 Relatedly, public diplomacy 
expert Philip Seib has argued that when public diplomacy efforts 
such as international broadcasting are “wrapped in the trappings of 
journalism” they have added credibility.11 Seib also suggests that 
longtime associations between public diplomacy and propaganda 
should give international broadcasters added incentive to engage in 
ethical and independent journalistic practices in order to heighten 
credibility among foreign audiences.12
The BBG’s mission statement stresses the journalistic intent 
of USIB, emphasizing the broadcasters’ protections from political 
interference and distancing them from any government tendency 
to produce propaganda instead of even-handed journalism.13 An 
unpublished dissertation examining the BBG suggests that the 
changing structure of government control over U.S. international 
broadcasting following the end of the Cold War, manifesting in the 
creation of the BBG, has made it more difficult for policymakers 
to influence broadcast content. This firewall, it is suggested, allows 
broadcasters more professional independence14 and presumably 
leads to heightened credibility for the content. 
Although some experts predicted a decline in the importance of 
international broadcasting in the aftermath of the Cold War, James 
Glassman, a career journalist, one-time chair of the BBG, and former 
U.S. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs, spoke of its continued importance noting “My view has 
always been that U.S. international broadcasting is journalism with 
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purpose, not, as many have argued, to burnish the U.S. image, but 
rather, to advance vital U.S. interests.”15 Consistent with this view, the 
missions of each of the broadcasters comprising U.S. international 
broadcast efforts demonstrate a commitment to journalism in the 
interest of free speech and democracy promotion.
The five content producers in the U.S. international broadcasting 
stable are Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
Radio Free Asia, Radio & Television Martí, and the Middle East 
Broadcasting Networks. Together, these broadcasters reach a 
reported global audience of 175 million people.16 The Broadcasting 
Board of Governors oversees them all.17 The following section offers 
a brief introduction to each of the five broadcasters that comprise U.S. 
international broadcast efforts as part of a larger public diplomacy 
strategy (see Figure 1).
U.S. international broadcasters
Voice of America
Founded in 1942, Voice of America is the flagship U.S. 
international broadcaster. It is one of the two federal broadcasters 
under the direct management of the BBG (see Figure 1) as opposed 
to the three private broadcasters operating as BBG grantees, an 
arrangement which is discussed in more detail below. VOA employs 
more than 1,200 people and operates with a budget of more than 
$200 million. It broadcasts in 43 languages and has a global audience 
of approximately 141 million.18 VOA’s charter, signed by President 
Gerald Ford in 1976, requires the broadcaster to provide “balanced 
and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and 
institutions… presenting the policies of the United States clearly and 
effectively.”19 It is also called upon to provide a forum for responsible 
debate on these issues.
Officially, VOA is distinguished from the BBG’s other 
broadcasters in several ways. First, it is the oldest, having its origins 
in the Office of War Information during World War Two. Second, it 
is the only one of the U.S.-government funded broadcasters required 
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to present a view of the United States and its policies, rather than 
to function primarily as a surrogate broadcaster in less-than-free 
media environments. When editorials were introduced into the 
VOA line-up during the Reagan Administration, for example, many 
believed this jeopardized the truth-telling mission the broadcaster 
had cultivated with its first transmission when it declared “The news 
may be good or bad. We shall tell you the truth.”20 Third, VOA’s 
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mission is global rather than regional. This distinction becomes clear 
with the introduction of the other U.S. broadcasters.21 
VOA has been at the center of controversies about both quality 
of content and mechanism of content delivery. In February 2012, 
for example, the Voice of America Russian Service posted an 
interview on its website with Alexi Navalny, a leading Russian 
opposition figure. The interview was a coup for VOA’s Russian 
language program, especially since broadcasts in that language 
had been limited to internet distribution only after budget cuts 
eliminated television and radio funding in 2008. The problem with 
the interview was that it was a fabrication. Navalny himself called 
it “100% fake.”22 VOA later issued an apology and U.S.-based 
news reports suggest the broadcaster has since made its peace with 
Navalny.23 
Prior to the Navalny dustup, VOA had earned domestic media 
coverage and a Congressional rebuke when the BBG’s management 
decided to eliminate shortwave radio broadcasts to China, instead 
shifting the cost savings to production and distribution of internet 
and mobile media content. A vocal reaction from VOA Mandarin 
language service employees and the intervention of strong China 
critics in Congress led to the scuttling of this reallocation of 
resources.24
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Voice of America may be the best known U.S. international 
broadcaster, but there are four others producing content designed to 
help facilitate American foreign policy goals around the globe. Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a non-federal grantee of the 
BBG, functioning as a “surrogate broadcaster” or as a professional 
substitute for audiences in countries without free and professional 
media traditions of their own. This grantee “broadcasts uncensored 
news and information…to countries where a free press is either 
banned by the government or not fully established.”25
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Founded 60 years ago, RFE/RL is widely credited with having 
played a central role in the collapse of communism in 1989 and in 
inspiring the new generation of leaders that appeared thereafter. 
In fact, in 1991 the former president of Estonia nominated the 
broadcaster for the Nobel Peace Prize.26 In the aftermath of the 
Cold War, RFE/RL began broadcasting in regions beyond its 
original range and its audience now includes listeners in Iraq, Iran, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.27 This expansion of broadcast area is 
often pointed to as an example of overlap among U.S. international 
broadcasters since VOA and the Middle East Broadcasting 
Networks, another of the U.S. international broadcasters, also 
produce content for some of these audiences.
According to the latest BBG annual report, RFE/RL broadcasts 
are heard in 21 countries in 28 languages with a combined weekly 
audience of more than 20 million. Its budget in 2011 was $92.7 
million. It employs 400 full-time journalists and 750 freelancers 
while staffing 19 local news bureaus.28 The scale of this operation 
leads its website to proclaim “RFE/RL is one of the most 
comprehensive news operations in the world.”29 
The Russian language component of this broadcaster, however, 
has changed significantly in just the last few months. In September 
2012, the broadcaster fired 33 Russian language journalists and 
staff members following the passage of a Russian law preventing 
foreign news organizations from broadcasting on domestic AM 
airwaves.30 Content will continue to be available via the internet, but 
a protest lodged with the U.S. Congress is seeking reinstatement of 
the journalists, claiming the firings specifically targeted reporters 
and specialists who focused on human rights issues in Russia. 
The president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Steven Korn, 
defended the move as an effort to modernize the broadcaster’s 
operations. The conservative Heritage Foundation, however, has 
called this series of events “the greatest crisis in RL’s history.”31 
In response to the negative publicity surrounding these dismissals, 
BBG announced a six-month investigation into the broadcaster’s 
operations in Russia32 and Korn was subsequently relieved of 
duty.33 
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Radio Free Asia
RFE/RL’s sister, non-profit U.S. government grantee broadcaster 
is Radio Free Asia (RFA). It was established through the International 
Broadcasting Act of 1994, discussed in more detail below. RFA began 
broadcasting in 1995 and currently broadcasts in nine languages: 
Burmese, Cantonese, Khmer, Korean, Laotian, Mandarin, Tibetan, 
Uyghur and Vietnamese.34 Its mission is to “provide accurate and 
timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments 
prohibit access to a free press.”35 The broadcaster employs more than 
250 people and it operates with a budget of almost $40 million.36 
Several of its language services have been targeted for 
downsizing or elimination by the BBG, although members of 
Congress have intervened to preserve funding in some cases. 
Broadly speaking, inevitable appeals on the part of USIB employees 
to Congressional overseers and the frequent Congressional attention 
in response naturally raise questions about how insulated from 
political pressures all the broadcasters really are if Congressional 
intervention can result in the overturning of BBG management 
decisions with which it disagrees.
At RFA’s founding, the CQ Almanac described the broadcaster 
as the “brainchild” of then-Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (DE), noting 
the senator readily acknowledged the project would upset China. 
About the introduction of this likely irritant to the U.S.-China 
bilateral relationship at the time, Senator Biden said, “To be sure, 
China will be unhappy. But Beijing’s petulance ought not to guide 
American policy.”37
 Several of the countries whose audiences are targeted by RFA 
actively resist the content, jamming broadcasts and blocking internet 
access. Similar government reactions to USIB content worldwide 
have led to the BBG’s ongoing efforts to develop circumvention 
technologies allowing audiences to access USIB content despite 
their governments’ ongoing attempts to block access.38
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Almost 20 years after RFA’s founding, China continues to 
resist the broadcaster by refusing to issue visas to individuals 
working for it. In fact, the Chinese government’s recalcitrance in 
issuing visas for journalists employed by RFA or VOA led members 
of Congress to introduce the Chinese Media Reciprocity Act in 
2011. The legislation would require China to issue as many visas 
to employees of USIBs as the United States issues to journalists 
working for Chinese government-sponsored media outlets. China’s 
failure to do so would result in the United States taking action to 
expel Chinese journalists already in the United States.39 Criticized 
for its likelihood to generate headlines that would damage the United 
States’ reputation as a promoter of press freedom,40 the legislation 
nevertheless demonstrates the intensity of Congressional interest 
in U.S. international broadcasters and a willingness to intervene to 
influence their performance.
Radio and Television Martí
Like VOA, Radio and Television Martí is operated directly by 
the BBG, rather than as a non-profit grantee like the other three 
broadcasters. Located within the BBG’s Office of Cuba Broadcasting 
(see Figure 1), it is a Miami-based effort dedicated solely to producing 
content for Cuba. It has an annual budget of almost $30 million and 
is named after the nineteenth century Cuban independence fighter 
José Martí.41 It began broadcasting in 198542 and broadcasts only 
in Spanish. The BBG’s annual report calls the broadcaster “a one-
of-a-kind service that brings unbiased, objective information to the 
Cuban people.”43
Although all of its broadcasts into Cuba are jammed by that 
government, the broadcaster reports having “a unique relationship 
with Cuban bloggers and dissidents” and boasts a nearly 500,000–
name list of email and text message recipients.44 Total broadcast 
audience numbers are not available, but Martí reports an updated 
web presence beginning in 2011 has increased web traffic by more 
than 1,000 percent.45 The continued existence of the broadcaster, 
despite concerns about both its effectiveness and its reported 
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audience numbers, is attributed to the influence of ongoing anti-
Castro sentiment in the U.S. Congress.46 On this subject, a report 
in CQ Weekly quoted an unnamed State Department official saying 
“The board [BBG] would like to get rid of Cuban broadcasting 
because it’s jammed anyway and no one in Cuba can listen to it, but 
anti-Cuban lawmakers won’t allow that.”47
A recent controversy concerning Radio and Television Martí 
involved a May 2012 editorial posted by the director of the Office 
of Cuba Broadcasting declaring that Cuban Cardinal Jaime Ortega 
was a “lackey” of the Cuban government. The editorial was 
representative of criticisms of the Cardinal among Cuban exiles in 
the United States, but not representative of public positions taken by 
the U.S. government.48 Writing about this incident, The Washington 
Post noted “The stinging editorial against Cardinal Jaime Ortega 
—signed by Radio and TV Martí’s director, Carlos Garcia-Perez—
is significant because Martí is a U.S. government agency, with its 
board of directors appointed by the White House and its policies 
coordinated with the State Department to direct messages to 
Cubans.”49
Concerned about the message that the broadcaster’s 
condemnation of the Cardinal would send when the Church in Cuba 
had previously been praised by the United States for its humanitarian 
efforts, members of Congress wrote to Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton saying “These words, published in the name of the U.S. 
government, are unacceptable and should not be allowed to stand 
without comment or rejection by the Administration.”50 The editorial 
was subsequently removed from the broadcaster’s website.
The incident highlights a situation unique among the five U.S. 
international broadcasters since Radio and Television Martí may 
be the only USIB entity that can point to having an interested 
domestic constituency outside of Congress. Indeed, one summary 
of the incident noted the editorial was representative of criticism 
of the Cardinal circulating among the Cuban exile community in 
South Florida at the time, implying that the broadcaster may be more 
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influenced by the exile community than it is by U.S. foreign policy 
positions.51
Additionally, although Voice of America has been broadcasting 
editorials since the Reagan Administration, the incident points to 
questions about U.S. international broadcasters’ commitment to 
the journalistic principle of objectivity. Setting aside the politics 
surrounding the topic addressed in the editorial, its removal 
after a strong Congressional response raises concerns about the 
independence of broadcasters funded by the U.S. government. The 
need for objective journalism as part of a public diplomacy strategy 
was exactly the issue raised by Philip Seib when he wrote about 
“transnational journalism.” For countries engaged in the production 
of public diplomacy content that is “wrapped in the trappings of 
journalism,”52 the appearance of journalistic characteristics alone is 
unlikely to be enough to ensure credibility in the eyes of receiving 
audiences. 
Middle East Broadcasting Networks
The fifth U.S. broadcaster under the purview of the BBG is the 
Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). It employs more than 
700 people and operates with a budget of more than $110 million. 
MBN is the third, non-profit, private grantee of the BBG and it 
operates Alhurra Television and Radio Sawa with broadcasts to 
21 Arabic-speaking countries and a reported audience of about 33 
million. Its mission is to “provide objective, accurate, and relevant 
news and information to the people of the Middle East about the 
region, the world, and the United States.”53 
MBN is headquartered in Springfield, Virginia but has bureaus 
and stringers around the Middle East and Europe. Founded in 2002, it 
is the newest of the BBG’s five broadcast entities. The establishment 
of MBN was clearly a reaction to anti-American sentiment in the 
Middle East, made painfully apparent in the region’s post-9/11 
attitudes and public opinion surveys.54 Still, some have argued 
the assumption that other media in the region were negatively 
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predisposed to the United States—the primary argument used to 
justify investment in this new broadcaster—was flawed.55 
Pointing to a variety of concerns about MBN’s broadcasters, The 
Washington Post cited critics who argue that the U.S. government 
erred in its assumption that MBN’s efforts would meet with the same 
successes as Radio Free Europe during the Cold War.56 When Alhurra 
began broadcasting in 2004, for example, The Washington Post 
called it the “U.S. government’s largest and most expensive effort to 
sway foreign opinion over the airwaves since the creation of Voice 
of America in 1942.”57 In a sign of problems within the broadcaster, 
just two years after its launch Alhurra’s first news director resigned 
citing the broadcaster’s “tendency to please Washington and not the 
audience.”58 
Meanwhile, Radio Sawa, which began broadcasting in 2002, 
was the target of a controversial 2004 draft report from the Office 
of the Inspector General of the Department of State. According to 
The Washington Post, “The draft report said that while Radio Sawa 
has been promoted as a ‘heavily researched broadcasting network,’ 
the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not 
on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audiences.”59 
The implication was that the channel’s emphasis on entertainment, 
which was found to comprise seventy-five percent of the content, was 
giving short shrift to the kind of content that justified the channel’s 
creation in the first place.
Among other concerns about the effectiveness of MBN’s content 
and the possibility of its content or language duplicating the efforts 
of other U.S. international broadcasters, MBN was the subject of 
a scathing investigative report in 2008 produced jointly by Pro 
Publica and 60 Minutes. Visiting the broadcaster’s headquarters, 
the report’s investigators found “an untrained, largely foreign staff 
with little knowledge of the country whose values and policies they 
were hired to promote.”60 These findings were not inconsistent with 
earlier missteps on the part of MBN’s broadcasters, including the 
greeting of its largely Muslim audience one Easter with “Jesus is 
risen today!”61 
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The Pro Publica and 60 Minutes report criticized lax oversight 
procedures and observed that the person tasked with managing 
the entire operation did not even speak Arabic. The highly critical 
exposé did not gain much public traction, but it provided fodder 
for policymakers who were already concerned about the BBG’s 
willingness and ability to oversee all the operations for which it is 
responsible. The universality of such concerns regarding all five of 
the broadcasters is an issue addressed in more detail later in this 
article.
Speaking in 2011 about the performance of MBN broadcasters 
during the Arab Spring, the then-chair of the BBG’s board, Walter 
Isaacson, declared “We have to be credible, informative and accurate. 
That’s core to our values… If ever there is a case in which coverage 
of an event might not seem in line with U.S. policy, it doesn’t matter. 
We cover it.”62 Isaacson’s subsequent resignation, further cuts to 
all BBG broadcasters, and ongoing Congressional intervention 
in various aspects of all five broadcasters’ operations suggest the 
idealism conveyed by Isaacson’s statement may not play in the real 
world of U.S. international broadcasting.
Authorization for the BBG
The BBG’s five broadcasters demonstrate the geographic range 
of USIB and the differing political and foreign policy rationales 
employed to justify each broadcaster’s existence. Discussion now 
turns to the statutory justification for the existence of the broadcasters 
as a whole. As discussion below indicates, although the United 
States has been engaged in international broadcasting since World 
War II, the BBG is relatively new on the scene. An understanding 
of legislation leading up to the creation of the BBG helps provide 
context for the current environment and for the organizational 
structure represented in Figure 1.
The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948
The foundation for contemporary U.S. international broadcasting 
efforts was laid with passage of the U.S. Information and Educational 
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Exchange Act of 1948, also known as the Smith-Mundt Act.63 
The law authorized American public diplomacy efforts, including 
international broadcasting; international information programs; and 
educational and cultural exchanges. The bill was passed only after 
extended Congressional debate about, first, the potential dangers of 
having Soviet schoolteachers roaming the American heartland as part 
of exchange programs, and second, concerns that the government’s 
international broadcasting efforts could pose unfair competition to 
the country’s nascent domestic broadcast industry.64
Congress eventually passed the bill when it became clear the 
Soviet Union had launched an actively anti-American propaganda 
campaign in Western Europe following the end of World War Two. 
Congress decided the United States needed to play a more forceful 
role in countering Soviet disinformation efforts and in promoting 
the democratic values enshrined in the American constitution. 
International broadcasting was the method selected for promoting 
this message. In these early days, Voice of America was the only 
U.S. broadcaster, having first emerged as a wartime tool of the Office 
of War Information, but later moving to the Department of State. 
It remained within the State Department until creation of the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. When Congress folded USIA 
into the State Department in 1998, USIB, under the purview of the 
BBG, became an independent entity. This shift is discussed in more 
detail in the section below focusing on the Foreign Affairs Reform 
& Restructuring Act of 1998.
In 1949, the CQ Almanac summarized the Smith-Mundt Act and 
its mandates for public diplomacy as having two primary purposes: 
“One is an information service stemming from the Office of War 
Information’s foreign activities and including the radio ‘Voice 
of America’… The other is an exchange of students, teachers, 
and technical consultants between the United States and foreign 
countries... Both aim to promote better understanding of the United 
States and strengthen international relations.”65 Still, the legislation 
only passed with conditions, one of which was intended to protect 
the domestic broadcast industry by preventing real-time distribution 
of USIB content within the United States.
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In amendments to the legislation after 1948, the real-time 
dissemination ban evolved to a more complete blockage of USIB 
content within the United States, making such content not only 
unavailable to the public for a period of time after initial broadcast, 
but also exempting it from Freedom of Information Act requests.66 
With the advent of the internet and its disregard for national borders, 
it is now easier for Americans stateside to consume USIB content, 
but it is still not readily available in a format accessible for U.S.-
based scholars and journalists to analyze the content and its messages 
in any methodical fashion.67
A 2011 Congressional proposal to remove the domestic 
dissemination ban resulted in cries that the American public would be 
overrun with government-sponsored propaganda from international 
broadcasters and other federal entities.68 Since President Obama 
signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law at the 
beginning of 2013, however, the domestic dissemination ban is now 
set for repeal. As of July 1, 2013, the ban will no longer be in effect. 
The end of the domestic dissemination ban means the elimination 
of a significant hurdle to increased visibility for U.S. international 
broadcasting among the American public.
The International Broadcasting Act of 1994
In 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the International Broadcasting 
Act (IBA)69 declaring “It is the policy of the United States to promote 
the right of freedom of opinion and expression, including the 
freedom ‘to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers,’ in accordance with Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”70 The legislation 
was intended to help consolidate U.S. international broadcasting 
efforts and to ensure that the American message of freedom of 
expression would be spread throughout the post-Cold War world. It 
established the Broadcasting Board of Governors within the United 
States Information Agency as the entity responsible for managing 
USIB. It also authorized the creation of Radio Free Asia as an USIB 
grantee targeting regions of Asia without independent indigenous 
media outlets of their own.
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The International Broadcasting Act was part of the much larger 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 and it comprised Title 
III of the legislation. This part of the legislation established standards 
for USIB, created the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and 
articulated the authorities of the Board including the mandate that 
all USIB content be consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
It also established the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), the 
arm of the BBG which provides operational guidance and support for 
the organization and its broadcasters on legal, financial and technical 
issues71 (see Figure 1).
The legislation repealed the Board for International Broadcasting 
Act of 1973 that had previously governed USIB operations. The 
change mandated that all oversight and management duties of USIB 
be relegated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
As noted to above, the Act also laid the groundwork for Radio 
Free Asia as a non-profit grantee broadcaster and allowed for its 
potential continuation after 1998 should the president approve of 
the work it had done. Finally, the Act authorized the provision of 
annual grants to RFE/RL and indicated that the duties and expenses 
of both RFE/RL and RFA would ideally be assumed by the private 
sector by the end of 1999. Scholar Monroe Price suggests this was 
an indicator of Congressional intent that surrogate broadcasters 
were not to become permanent, publicly supported operations.72 To 
date, however, both organizations remain fully funded by the U.S. 
government although, as represented in the BBG’s organizational 
chart, they are operated as private, non-federal, non-profit 
organizations.
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
As suggested by historian Nicholas J. Cull, it was a belief 
by the Clinton Administration that the various roles of the U.S. 
Information Agency were so central to U.S. foreign policy efforts 
that they belonged within the Department of State itself that led 
to their incorporation into the Department as part of the Foreign 
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Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.73 The legislation dissolved 
the U.S. Information Agency and merged all of its operations, 
except for international broadcasting, into the Department of State. 
Although operational and strategic benefits were expected from this 
consolidation of public diplomacy efforts with the Department of 
State, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA)74 
was nevertheless primarily intended as a money-saving measure. 
As Cull has noted, this consolidation was a low-risk political 
move for Congress given the well-recognized dearth of a domestic 
constituency for foreign policy.75
USIB was the only component of American public diplomacy 
not merged into the Department of State with FARRA. International 
broadcasting remained under the purview of the BBG as created in 
1994, but the BBG itself emerged from the 1998 legislation as an 
independent agency.
As Cull writes “There was an irony in the victory of the free 
market system in the Cold War. Although the end of the Cold War 
certainly made the world safe for the free market, the battle had 
been fought by state-subsidized media going to places and showing 
things that afforded no short-term profit.”76 The changes to the 
operational structure of U.S. international broadcasting as a result 
of FARRA demonstrated the consequences of this “free market” 
victory for international broadcasting. For USIB, the changed 
international environment ultimately led to a changed domestic 
structure responsible for its daily management and for justifying its 
continued existence. It was no longer afforded the protections of a 
larger executive branch institution and although in theory this might 
have been expected to further promote the broadcasters’ editorial 
independence, it has in practice led to increased vulnerability to 
Congressional intervention and to decreased daily oversight of 
operations.
A highly critical independent report published in 2007 noted that 
following post-Cold War budget cuts, the International Broadcasting 
Act’s consolidation of broadcast operations, and the disappearance of 
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USIA as its home institution, USIB and the organizational structure 
of its government home emerged as “an illogical patchwork, an 
archipelago of broadcasting organizations lacking clear individual 
missions and lacking a normal separation between management 
and oversight. The organizational chart of the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors (BBG) reveals the dimensions of this dysfunction.”77 
The following discussion highlights some of the consequences of the 
current arrangement.
Managing the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Although federally funded, the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
and its broadcasters are facing many of the same pressures as their 
brethren in private sector media organizations: Money is tight. 
Audience is hard to measure. The internet is disruptive. And strong 
top-level management is paramount. The first decade of the 21st 
century heightened awareness of the “interest one society has in the 
media space of others”78 and the media space of others is exactly the 
place international broadcasting seeks to be.
The “illogical patchwork” of the BBG threatens the United States’ 
ability to manage, promote and grow its international broadcasting 
efforts and with that in mind, a series of recommendations for 
USIB were offered in a 2011 report from the Center for New 
American  Security (CNAS) focused on U.S. public engagement 
abroad. It praised USIB’s “long and proud history of fulfilling its 
mandate to broadcast credible news journalism rather than acting 
as an overt instrument of American propaganda.”79 But the report 
also recommended changing the structure surrounding USIB 
efforts without recreating an overall public diplomacy institution 
resembling the former USIA. A comprehensive, outside evaluation 
of the BBG, the CNAS report argued, should be undertaken to 
consider BBG strategy from the top down, assessing in particular 
how it aligns with U.S. national security objectives in both the short- 
and long-term; discerning how USIB can compete meaningfully 
in an age of information abundance; studying USIB’s proper role 
and mission relative to private and non-profit information providers 
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as well as allocation of resources for attaining those objectives; 
and determining how the agency can coordinate with other U.S. 
entities and the private sector without jeopardizing its mandate of 
independence.80
Although it was not as comprehensive as the study recommended 
by the CNAS report, the BBG did in fact commission an outside 
review of the three grantee broadcasters. It specifically considered 
the prospects for merging USIB grantees Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcasting 
Networks. The final report offered strong support for such 
consolidation.81 Other benefits of consolidation as highlighted in 
the outside review included significant cost savings from reduced 
duplication of administrative and other services among the three 
broadcasters. The report suggested, in a nod to the BBG’s political 
keepers, that if improved efficiencies and outcomes could be 
delivered without actually increasing the bottom line, Congress 
would likely be pleased. The financial and bureaucratic transparency 
resulting from consolidation would also be welcomed, the report 
concluded.
The BBG’s 2012-2016 strategic plan, released in late 2011, 
seems to tackle some of the issues raised both by the CNAS report 
and the aforementioned outside review.82 It declares the BBG’s intent 
to integrate the five broadcasters into a single entity while preserving 
the five identifiable broadcast brands. To meet these goals the 
strategic plan declares the BBG will establish a global news network, 
exploit high-tech content delivery strategies including satellite video 
delivery, and develop more effective means of disrupting internet 
blocking and other methods of censorship.83 Summarizing the new 
approach, the plan says the BBG’s efforts are “predicated on the dual 
aims of fiscal and structural reform and assertive audience growth 
and mission fulfillment.”84
But BBG leadership’s effort to begin implementing the plan in 
the form of its annual budget request met with resistance. The BBG’s 
proposed FY2013 budget85 included cuts in both budget and staff for 
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the five broadcasters. In all, it called for a 4.2% cut from the previous 
year’s funding86 as well as the reallocation of some resources to 
social media promotion and development of internet censorship 
circumvention technologies.87 Response to the proposed budget 
was swift with current and former BBG employees and various 
commentators calling it destructive and a threat to the production of 
quality journalism.88 Congress, too, was displeased. As a result, in 
May 2012, the House Appropriations Committee voted to give the 
BBG $26.68 million more than it had requested. The Congressional 
support came with specific instructions about how to use it for 
promotion of broadcasters and the production of content directed to 
certain audiences worldwide.89
Whether the proposed cuts would have been “eviscerating” as 
suggested in commentaries reacting to the budget proposal sidesteps 
the important question of the apparent permeability of the firewall 
that is supposed to prevent Congressional or executive branch 
interference with the operation of USIB. In this case, employees 
of the BBG welcomed Congressional intervention in BBG’s senior 
level decision-making. The question, however, is how welcome 
Congressional intervention might be in other circumstances when 
it takes decisions with which the BBG rank and file does not agree. 
Concerns such as this about the firewall and the thorny issue of 
micromanagement from individuals outside the BBG itself have 
in the past led one public diplomacy scholar to observe that the 
desire to protect USIB from undue political influence is important, 
but “The issue becomes more complicated… when the firewall 
is invoked to protect broadcasters from reasoned criticism, and 
decisions relating to management and budget priorities, languages, 
technologies, and types of broadcasting.”90 What makes the FY2013 
budget incident particularly noteworthy with respect to the firewall 
is the evidence of Congressional willingness to intervene when 
there is public disagreement between BBG management and its 
employees. This sets a precedent for undercutting BBG leadership 
on day-to-day decisions without attending to the broader, long-term 
issues concerned with the challenges of BBG’s dual mandate to 
serve as both a foreign policy tool and a journalism organization.
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Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) once suggested that the Board’s 
firewall functions more frequently as a “football.”91 A January 2013 
report from the Department of State’s Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) concluded that, since its founding, the Board “has been fully 
staffed for only 7 of its 17 years of existence.”92 Moreover, many 
board members serve well beyond their appointed three-year terms 
since members can serve until replaced.93 The OIG report further 
notes that timely nomination and appointment of Board members is 
affected by White House delays in making appointments and Senate 
delays in confirming them.94 Delays in filling vacancies on the 
Board offer just one example of how politics can interfere with the 
operations of the BBG.95 In other words, permeability of the firewall 
is not the only concern on Capitol Hill.
Facing growing criticism from both within and without on a 
number of different issues, in June 2012 the board passed a resolution 
restricting public access to information about its deliberations, 
particularly with respect to legislative and budgetary matters.96 The 
decision to muzzle public discussion was not well received97 and 
led to increased critiques of a board already struggling to justify 
earlier decisions.98 The BBG’s action to block public deliberation 
led one Congressman to describe the organization as “opaque in its 
decision making and incredibility [sic] tone deaf to Congressional 
priorities.”99 The board’s resolution sought to assure members of 
Congress and others that the ban is standard among federal agencies 
and that it would have no effect on whistle-blowing protections 
for BBG employees.100 Nevertheless, the ban was consistent with 
already existing perceptions about a lack of both transparency and 
judgment on the part of BBG leadership.
Speaking of the challenges facing the BBG, James Glassman, 
observed “The BBG has an impossible mission.”101 He pointed 
specifically to the BBG’s simultaneous role as both a foreign policy 
tool and a journalistic institution. Glassman suggested the solution 
might be to more fully incorporate the BBG into the American 
foreign policy apparatus so it could receive more specific foreign 
policy guidance. At the same time, he cautioned, this should not 
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extend to overt influence over journalistic content. In an ideal 
situation, Glassman noted, the BBG would be both better informed 
about where to invest limited international broadcasting resources 
and better protected from interested members of Congress who are 
loathe to see certain programs altered or eliminated.102
Today, questions abound concerning the BBG’s performance 
as both a foreign policy tool and a journalism operation. Recent 
audience numbers released by the agency show a decline in audience 
for the five broadcasters, with estimated audience numbers dropping 
from 187 million in 2011 to 175 million in 2012.103 But even the 
method of data collection for the numbers necessary to evaluate 
USIB effectiveness has been publicly debated. When the BBG 
contracted with Gallup to conduct international audience research 
for the purpose of evaluating audience numbers, BBG employees 
expressed concern that to cover the cost of the contract BBG 
management would need to downsize its workforce.104
One of the problems with BBG performance, some observers 
suggest, is that appointed board members, together comprising 
the multi-headed top-level management for the agency and its 
broadcasters, rarely have either the foreign policy or journalism 
experience necessary to run such an operation effectively.105 As an 
example, critics point to Dana Perino, former press secretary for 
President George W. Bush whose “foreign policy expertise was 
called into question when she admitted she had never heard of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.”106
Although the legislation authorizing creation of the Board 
of Governors requires that board members be American citizens 
selected from “among Americans distinguished in the fields of mass 
communications, print, broadcast media or foreign affairs,”107 critics 
argue that appointments meeting these requirements have been the 
exception rather than the rule. Moreover, as noted elsewhere, , the 
appointments do not come quickly enough when vacancies occur.108 
Issues concerning appointment of board members, extended 
vacancies on the board, the performance of the five broadcasters, 
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and the overall judgment of the organization’s leadership have 
led to increasingly public concerns about the performance of the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors, an agency more accustomed to 
maintaining a low profile in the policy environment.
It seems clear the status quo cannot hold, and while the BBG’s 
strategic plan calls for consolidation of USIB efforts, other options 
have circulated in the policy community. One of the proposed 
alternatives includes abolishing the BBG altogether and creating 
a hub for “strategic communication” that would coordinate the 
messages distributed by the Department of State, the Department 
of Defense and U.S. international broadcasters. In mentioning this 
option, however, international broadcast expert Kim Andrew Elliott 
cautions “The audiences for international broadcasting, seeking 
the antidote for the type of news that they get domestically, would 
almost immediately recognize coordinated news for what it is, and 
tune out.”109 This, again, points to the “impossible mission” referred 
to by Glassman wherein the BBG is required to promote U.S. foreign 
policy while it practices credible journalism.110
Elliott suggests managing the BBG with a consortium comprised 
of leading American broadcast news organizations. He writes that 
under this arrangement, companies such as ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox 
News and CNN “would appoint an executive to a five-person board, 
which would, in turn, appoint the chief executive officer of the 
consolidated international broadcasting corporation and approve 
the CEO’s senior management selections.”111 A benefit of this 
arrangement, Elliott argues, is that if Congress or the administration 
had concerns about content, they could approach the board rather 
than going directly to the broadcasters. He also notes the arrangement 
could lead to a more cooperative relationship between the private 
broadcasters and USIB, with the latter well positioned to share its 
international expertise with the private news organizations.  He 
suggests that under such an arrangement, all the broadcasters “would 
enjoy the synergy now available to the BBC World Service and BBC 
domestic as they exchange coverage and resources.”112 
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This outcome is reminiscent of suggestions offered by others who 
already recommend that the American domestic journalism industry 
consider making better use of USIB content which is, according 
to its terms of use, already in the public domain.113 Any lingering 
barriers to this kind of cooperation have been removed with repeal of 
the domestic dissemination ban imposed by the Smith-Mundt Act.114 
Providing more USIB content to stateside audiences also eliminates 
the irony that arose from a domestic ban on distribution of content 
designed, in part, to promote the benefits of a free press worldwide.115 
Increased domestic distribution could also yield benefits in terms of 
accountability for content; creation of a domestic constituency in 
support of the broadcasters; and a likely increase in formal study of 
the broadcasters, their operations, their management and their place 
in the practice of American foreign policy.
Regardless of whether any sort of bureaucratic reorganization 
takes place, the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the work of 
its broadcasters offer a largely untapped source of research questions 
for both foreign policy and journalism researchers. Possible avenues 
for research include comparisons of the BBG to other nations’ 
international broadcasting bureaucracies; comparisons of content 
produced by the different U.S. broadcasters looking for evidence 
of either redundancy or originality; evaluation of Voice of America 
or other USIB content on a given subject compared to the content 
produced by other nations’ broadcasters; comparison of USIB content 
to content produced by private, American news organizations; 
study of correlations between U.S. foreign policy positions and 
the coverage among the five broadcasters; ethnographic studies 
involving employees of the BBG and examining issues including 
ethics, institutional culture, decision making and views about 
the role of media in society; case studies examining the firewall 
between USIB broadcasters and the legislative and executive 
branches; assessment of journalistic norms and routines as practiced 
at the various broadcasters; application of existing knowledge about 
media economics to the USIB operations managed by the BBG; 
and exploration of the possibility of repurposing USIB content in 
American domestic media.
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Looking forward, more sustained attention to the BBG and 
the five broadcasters could serve the public good by shining light 
on a part of the American foreign policy apparatus that has rarely 
been the subject of formal academic study, detailed policy research, 
or comprehensive media attention. Results of such heightened 
attention may have the added benefit of bringing more effective 
leadership, increased transparency and better outcomes for all USIB 
stakeholders.
For now, the January 2013 report from the Department of State’s 
Inspector General and reactions to it are bringing in some of that 
attention. Offering several recommendations for improving overall 
governance of the BBG, the report also presents a highly critical 
view of a single board member. That member is never identified by 
name although enough information is provided to allow readers to 
discern the Governor’s identity. While the report agrees that there 
is a significant level of dysfunction in the operation of the BBG, it 
seems to attribute much of that dysfunction to what it frames as the 
disruptive behavior of a single Governor. Effectively absolving other 
Governors and the BBG’s full-time staff of responsibility for the 
organization’s difficulties, the OIG report declares that through the 
interviews conducted for the inspection it concluded “the Board’s 
current paralysis was the fault of a single Governor and that the 
reputations of other Board members should not be damaged because 
of his tactics.”116 It similarly passed no judgment on the BBG’s 
full-time staff in the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) (see 
Figure 1), the division responsible for strategic management of U.S. 
international broadcasting.
Speaking mostly in vague terms about other matters, the report 
has been roundly criticized as uneven, grossly unfair to the targeted 
Governor, neglectful of core issues concerning the future of USIB, 
and generally failing to address the types of systemic concerns 
mentioned elsewhere in this article.117 Unfortunately for the BBG, 
the 2013 OIG report is likely to be viewed in the long-term as a 
short-sighted, politically motivated attack on a Governor who 
appears to be taking his board appointment seriously. For the short-
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term, however, the report serves only as further evidence of well-
documented dysfunction associated with the management of U.S. 
international broadcasting.
Conclusions
Preceding discussion has considered the role of international 
broadcasting in American public diplomacy and the place of 
the Broadcasting Board of Governors therein. It has introduced 
the five broadcasters in the USIB stable and details about recent 
challenges facing each of them. It has also discussed the legislation 
governing USIB and leading to the current structure of the BBG, 
the broadcasters themselves, and the political and bureaucratic 
environments in which they operate. Emerging from those discussions 
one can see the outlines of difficulties associated with navigating the 
current management structure, balancing the relationship between 
management and funders in Congress, and ensuring the production 
of journalistic content that will help further American foreign policy 
priorities. While these difficulties may have long existed beneath the 
surface, they are increasingly public and require meaningful action 
to address – sooner rather than later.
Seventy years after VOA’s first transmission, international 
broadcasting still plays an important role in American public 
diplomacy efforts. But the USIB status quo cannot hold. 
Acknowledging the need for significant changes, the BBG has 
announced an effort to develop a legislative package tentatively 
called the International Broadcasting Innovation Act.118 Comments 
from senior BBG officials and board members suggest one of 
the primary goals of such legislation will be to create a statutory 
mechanism that authorizes creation of a single chief executive officer 
(CEO) for the Broadcasting Board of Governors. As was noted at the 
December 2012 board meeting, however, even the introduction of 
such legislation may be as long as a year away.119 
Until legislation that creates a single executive for the BBG and 
then authorizes that executive to make decisions reaching across 
the five broadcasters and other BBG administrators, debate about 
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everything from content delivery to budget requests to implementation 
of the strategic plan risks looking like wasted energy. Indeed, barring 
passage of such transformative legislation, it seems unlikely that any 
decisions that manage to emerge from the current structure could do 
more than nibble around the edges of the “illogical patchwork” that 
is contemporary U.S. international broadcasting.
Of all the issues surrounding USIB, this is the one most worthy 
of prompt Congressional intervention. The status quo allows various 
interests to play against one another in an effort to influence broadcast 
efforts for personal, political or bureaucratic gain, but such intra-
governmental infighting benefits no one, least of which the audiences 
that this American public diplomacy tool purports to serve or the 
country in whose name the tool is wielded. One hopes that 2013 
will bring the introduction of legislation and with it Congressional 
hearings that will result in substantive oversight, transparent policy 
debate, establishment of meaningful performance indicators, and 
ultimately, a measure of order to the “illogical patchwork” that has 
been American international broadcasting in the post-Cold War era.
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